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Article 4

Commentary
By Barbara Allen Babcock*

Problems In Professional Responsibilityt
The Old Testament tells of a meeting much like ours today:
"And all the people gathered themselves together as one man into
the street that was before the water gate ....
And Ezra ...
brought the law before the congregation both of men and women.
." (Nehemiah 8:1-2)
Presuming to act as Ezra before the water gate, I have no complicated "law" to bring you. Although the Watergate affair has
raised a storm about lawyers' ethics, and has created a demand for
professional responsibility to be taught in law schools and be examined on by the bar, and for lawyers to create new standards
and new modes of enforcing them, there is nothing in what any
Watergate lawyer is accused of which would indicate that plain old
Judeo-Christian standards will not do as a standard for professional
responsibility: "Thou shalt not steal. Thou shalt not bear false
witness against thy neighbor. Thou shalt not covet thy neighbor's
house, nor his ox nor his ass, nor anything that is thy neighbor's."
And perhaps: "Thou shalt not make unto thee any graven
image, or any likeness of anything," for those who recorded the
tapes, and "Thou shalt not bow down thyself to them," for those who
made the presidency an image for indiscriminate worship. At any
rate, neither courses in ethics nor better discipline by the bar, nor
keener awareness of delicate ethical issues have much to do with
Watergate, where the things of which lawyers, particularly, were
accused did not involve close questions.
There are, however, complex and difficult issues surrounding
the meaning of professional responsibility. The first principle
(one which is not generally understood by lay people or many
lawyers either) is that professional ethics sometimes vary from, and
stretch beyond, personal ethics. This means that lawyers may be
caught in the most painful decisions where dictates of training and
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PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY
personality point one way while the requirements of professional
responsibility point the other.
Consider, for example, a case which arose when I was in practice. It was an armed robbery case-a typical one in which a man
went into a small liquor store, pointed a gun at the clerk, asked
for all the money, got it, and left. The clerk was the only witness,
but he was an unusually good witness, calm in the face of a terrifying experience, of the same race as the robber so especially able
to make a good identification; in fact, he had picked a photograph of
the lawyer's client from several dozen shown him by the police.
There was some circumstantial evidence, but nothing significant,
and the case rested on the identification by this witness. The client
denied guilt; the case was defendable; the lawyer prepared and
was ready to go to trial (though the lawyer did his preparation
within a few months after the client had been arrested, it was almost
a year from the date of arrest until the case was set for trial). A
'few days before the trial was to open, the lawyer decided he should
interview the witness a second time for a final evaluation of the
strength of the government's case. He discovered that the witness
had moved and changed jobs, but through the simple expedient of
checking the post office, the lawyer obtained a forwarding address,
found the witness and interviewed him. A year later, the witness
was as good as ever, still certain of the identification. Thus, on the
eve of the trial, the lawyer was discouraged until the prosecutor
called to report that he could not find the key witness, hence he
would have to ask for one more week to locate him, but would then
consent to the dismissal of the case. Both lawyers recognized that
since the case was old the judge would most likely order dismissal
on the spot. "Eureka," said the lawyer (to himself of course)"victory from the jaws of defeat"-and hung up the phone. Then
he thought: But how can this be when all that is necessary in order
to locate the witness is to check with the post office; and what am I
going to do when the prosecutor says the witness has disappeared.
Should I say what I know? What if the judge turns to me and asks
whether I know anything about the witness' whereabouts....
There followed a long night in which a group of lawyers from the
office try to determine a lawyer's duty in the various permutations
of this potential situation.
When a question comes up like this for lawyers, there is a primary place to turn, the Code of Professional Responsibility, produced under the auspices of the American Bar Association. When
one does this, she finds on the one hand, that a lawyer should
represent a client zealously within the bounds of law,' and on the
1. ABA CODE Or

PRor sioNAL

RESPONSmBmY

[hereinafter cited as ABA CODE].

CAqON No. 7

(1974)
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other hand that in so doing she should not "conceal or knowingly
fail to disclose that which [s] he is required by law to reveal."' 2 But
that guide is entirely question-begging, is it not, since what the
lawyer wants to know is whether she is required by law to reveal
the location of the witness. In the same vein, the Code tells us
in another rule that a lawyer shall not suppress any evidence that
she or her client has a legal obligation to produce 3- and that
lawyer shall not advise or cause a person to secrete himself or to
leave the jurisdiction of a tribunal for the purpose of making him
unavailable as a witness therein. 4 Clearly, the lawyer had not done
that. But should this rule be extended by inference to mean that
the lawyer should help assure the presence of witnesses at the trial?
In the end, the problem was solved by our imagining vividly
this scenario: how would the client feel when the prosecutor said
"Your honor we are going to have to dismiss this case eventually
because the government is unable to locate its key witness" and
in response his lawyer jumped up and said "Excuse me your honor,
if I may be of service to the court, I know where the witness is
."
That simply could not be zealous representation within the
bounds of the law.
The lawyer's duty was to remain silent. This is not an easy
decision-on any level. Think how the lawyer felt, as an individual,
having spent many hours in the preparation of the case; on the
level of self-interest it was a very hard decision; but beyond that
we knew that it was likely that the prosecutor would find the witness, discover that the defense lawyer had known the witness'
whereabouts and would tell the judge. Yet, in spite of these considerations, we all agreed that the lawyer's duty in this case lay not
with his own interests in getting the trial experience and pleasing
the judge, but lay instead with his client's interest. The scene
played out just as we had feared in our worst imaginings: the
prosecutor was given overnight to find the witness, did so and
reported in outrage what the lawyer had done in standing silent the
day before. The judge angrily declared that the lawyer had acted
unethically and removed him from the case.
This case is a clear example of the clash between personal ethics
and personal style, as well, which dictate openness, helpfulness, aiding the system by seeing that cases are brought to trial and guilt or
innocence finally determined and professional ethics which in the
context of this case called for considering duty to the client as para2. Id. D.R. 7-102 (A) (3).
3. Id. D.R. 7-109(A).
4. Id. D.R. 7-109(B).
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mount. The clash was not solvable: compromise between the
two sets of values was impossible. The lawyer had to choose-and
the choice had to be made without any real guidance from the profession's Code. There was a great deal at stake in this case for the
client, in part because one of the first acts of the Nixon administration was to increase the penalties for crimes of all sorts in the
District of Columbia. It was possible to receive a life sentence for
armed robbery, and the judge before whom the case was set was
tough. There was much at stake too for the lawyer who had to
practice every day in that jurisdiction: the possible anger and
enmity of this powerful judge, who would likely misunderstand if
the lawyer said nothing, but would be most pleased and commendatory if the lawyer volunteered the address of the witness.
Why was the lawyer running this personal risk in a routine criminal case for a man who was probably guilty? In making this decision, there was a higher and certain value which the lawyer was
expressing. It is an awesome thing when the state investigates and
accuses of crime-the total machinery of the society is organized
against the individual; the very accusation is damning. To counterbalance that, to make it fair, we have given the accused individual
one person-the defense lawyer-whose interests are not in the impartial determination of guilt or innocence, not in whether the system runs well and produces the correct result-one person, an advocate, trained and skilled, whose total commitment is to the accused.
With that conception of the defense lawyer's role, the lawyer in
this particular context had no choice. He did the right thing, which
in no way detracts from the individual courage required to do it.
Many lawyers would not have been inclined nor able to do it.
I do not mean to indicate that once having decided which value
is paramount that the solution is clear. When there are these unresolvable conflicts between personal and professional values,
lawyers often turn to each other with the plaintiveness apparent
in one of R. D. Laing's verbal knots:
There is something I don't know
that I am supposed to know.
I don't know what it is I don't know,
and yet am supposed to know,
And I feel I look stupid
if I seem both not to know it
and not know what it is I don't know.
Therefore, I pretend I know it.
This is nerve-wracking
since I don't know what I must pretend to know.
Therefore I pretend to know everything.
I feel you know what I am supposed to know
but you can't tell me what it is
because you don't know that I don't know what it is.
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You may know what I dor't know, but not
that I don't know it,
and I can't tell you. So you will have to
tell me everything. 5
Now, it is a short step, if any step at all, from the example I
have given of the lawyer who knows where the government witness
is to the following situation reported in the national press: Two
court-appointed attorneys are to represent a man who is clearly
a homicidal maniac. He admits to them that he committed the
murder of which he is accused, a stabbing in a campground, but
says that in addition he killed two other people in the vicinity. The
lawyers have him examined by psychiatrists who say he is mad,
and probably not legally responsible. He has a good insanity defense. (When I say "good," you should not hear "winning;" juries
generally do not acquit on insanity defenses when a heinous crime
is charged.) Even when believing that the accused is sick, they fear
him and fear that psychiatrists will release him before he is really
cured. (Guilty verdicts then are usually returned even when the
evidence of insanity is very strong.) At any rate, in this case, which
is hopeless as I have defined it, this wretched madman tells the lawyers that he has also killed two other people, and he tells them
where the bodies are hidden. What are the lawyers to do now?
They found and photographed the bodies. They were in the midst
of representing the client by trying to plea bargain to a lesser crime:
second degree murder.
Are they like any other citizen who has discovered a crime and
should report it? Surely not. Are they in the situation where the
dictates of the ABA Code are clear-"A lawyer should preserve the
confidences and secrets of a client."6 Or is this one of the exceptions to the rule, in which the Code allows a lawyer to reveal confidences or secrets when permitted by the disciplinary rules or required by law or court order.7 The footnote to that rule suggests
that "public policy forbids that the relation of an attorney and
client should be used to conceal wrongdoing on the part of the
client" and that "a communication by a client to his attorney in respect to the future commission of an unlawful act or to a continuing wrong is not privileged from disclosure." s The concealment
of the other two murders and of the evidence seems a continuing
wrong that the attorneys were called upon to disclose, one that was
not protected by the attorney-client relationship.
But imagine yourself in the place of these lawyers. They found
out about these other two deaths only through the trust and confi5. R. LAiNG, KNOTS 56 (1970).

6. ABA CODE Canon No. 4.
7. Id. D.R. 4-101 (C) (2).
8. Id. D.R. 4-01(C) (2) n.15.
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dence they had built with the client. The client is a crazy killer
against whom society wants vengeance. Disclosing this information
will assure the end of the client's life-either physically or mentally. Remember also that nothing is to be gained for these lawyers
personally by failing to disclose this information: this is not a rich
man who will pay them well; they will not be respected for it.
The parents of the dead people came and asked them if they had
any information. Can you imagine how difficult it was not to tell
these suffering people that rather than hope for the return of their
children they should adjust to their deaths? When all of these
things are considered, although I as a lawyer would have made a
different decision in this case, I think that their process of decision
making was probably highly ethical. But again, the point is that
lawyers everyday-not quite as dramatically as in this case-deal
with the most complex and difficult decisions, quite alone and without sufficient guidance from the profession or the society.
We are discussing the variance between personal and professional ethics. As the examples with which we have just dealt illustrate, there are grave ethical problems to be confronted and resolved when the stated duties to the client, to the court and to
the profession conflict. The lawyer is in a double bind: not only
is there a clash between personal and professional ethics, but there
is a further subcategory of conflict.
Professional ethics will more likely mandate, to a much greater
degree than personal ethics, that the lawyer do things which are,
at the least, personally distasteful. The lawyer will not be required
to lie or steal, but may be required to represent to the fullest a
person who has almost certainly savagely murdered a child; he may
be required to give this representation with the tact and concern
for that individual which one would exhibit toward an innocent
teenager accused of a minor crime, or to a former Harvard Law
School dean accused of tax evasion. That is what the Code of Professional Responsibility means when it says: "A lawyer should
assist the legal profession in fulfilling its duty to make legal counsel
available." 9 The Code adds that:
When a lawyer is appointed by a court, or requested by a bar association to undertake representation of a person unable to obtain
counsel, whether for financial or other reasons, he should not seek
to be excused from undertaking the representation except for compelling reasons. Compelling reasons do not include such factors as
the repugnance of the subject matter of the proceeding, the identity
or position of a person involved in the case, or the belief of the
lawyer that the defendant in a criminal proceeding is guilty, or the
belief of the lawyer regarding the merits of the civil case.' 0
9. ABA CoDE Canon No. 2.
10. Id. E.C. 2-29.
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We lawyers are told by our only official guide to professional
ethics that we have a duty to provide legal services to everyone,
whether or not the person can afford it, and that it is the ethical
obligation of each lawyer to aid the profession in that function.
That seems clear; it would seem clear, too, that there cannot be
a double standard of representation. The lawyer's role, according
to the ABA Vinimum Standards for Defense, is that of a "wise
counsellor and learned friend." We are to be zealous within the
bounds of the law. We are to use the same techniques of handholding-reassuring clients, communicating with them, and counselling, in the case of the alienated, incoherent armed robbery defendant-as we would for the bank president accused of embezzlement, or the former presidential aide accused of perjury, or perhaps
more to the point, the client in a civil case whose financial future
depends on our skills in successfully concluding a contract dispute.
Furthermore, the lawyer is called upon by the Code to be selfless in her representation. One of the classic examples of selflessness is that of Harold Medina's representation during the Second
World War of a man charged with treason. There had never previously been an interpretation of the treason section of the Constitution by the Supreme Court; the legal research and trial preparation
took many months; and the trial itself was an excruciating experience. When the summations were over and the judge had concluded his charge to the jury, but before he sent them to deliberate,
he asked the defense counsel to rise and proceeded to thank him for
his representation in the case, pointing out that he was assigned
without compensation and that he had performed a patriotic duty.
What was the counsel to do? The judge had in effect told the
jury that the lawyer probably did not believe in his client or his
cause, but was acting out of abstract duty. The judge had disassociated the lawyer from his client. Yet, if the lawyer objected at
this point, not only would he be widely misunderstood, accused of
ingratitude at the least and at the most of associating himself too
closely with his client, but he would also probably permanently
anger the judge. Despite this, Medina did take exception in front
of the jury to what the judge had said. This is an example of selfless courage.
Zealous representation must mean that for the pariah of society-and who is more so than the angry, young, heroin-addicted
man accused of a vicious armed robbery-the lawyer explores every
possible legal point, investigates all leads, and raises novel issues;
in short, she throws herself into the representation with the fervor
which a large retainer would inspire. There simply cannot be two
standards of representation. The role of the lawyer cannot shift

PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY
and her ethical duty cannot change according to whom she represents.
The ideal is to provide legal services of the same quality
to all people including those who are despised, often degraded, and
frightened. Think, for instance, of the lawyer called upon to represent the SLA "soldier" accused of killing a black school superintendent. A perfectly ethical lawyer appointed to such a case might
well candidly respond: "Dealing with this kind of case makes me
sick, and I am not so good at it-perhaps even incompetent. Moreover, high-class, careful legal representation is wasted in the hurlyburly of the criminal courts. The best lawyers there are the ones
who know the personnel and are there every day and can wheel
and deal. Furthermore, I don't even speak the same language as
these people. They can't understand me and I can't understand
them, so how am I to play my wise counsellor, learned friend role?
If I am to perform my ethical duty to make legal counsel available, there are better and socially more useful ways for me to do
it. I'll bring some test civil suits, or represent community groups.
Don't make me do this."
That position would find some support in the Code. Ethical
Consideration 2-30 says that a "lawyer should decline employment
if the intensity of [her] personal feeling, as distinguished from a
community attitude, may impair [her] effective representation,"' 1
and while this would seem to apply to paid representation since it
speaks in terms of "employment," the principle is applicable to all
kinds of representation. Also, a Disciplinary Rule of the Code
states that "a lawyer shall not handle a legal matter which [she]
knows or should know that [she] is not competent to handle without associating with [her] a lawyer who is competent to handle
it."12

Yet again, the Code states as a Disciplinary Rule that "a lawyer
shall not hold [her] self out publicly as a specialist"'13 except under
very narrow specified conditions. For instance, patent lawyers are
allowed to do so,' 4 and very recently several states, including California, have been experimenting with other specialization programs.
If lawyers, as envisioned by the Code, are not specialists but generalists, how can they be allowed, when appointed in criminal cases,
to say: "I'm not competent to handle this?" And what kind of
inquiry should be made about whether this disclaimer is a shorthand way of saying: "I am personally repelled, don't want to waste
11. Id. E.C. 2-30.

12. ABA CODE Canon No. 6, DM. 6-101(A) (1).
13. ABA CODE Canon No. 2, E.C. 2-14.
14. Id. E.C. 2-14 n.38.
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myself, and feel that the system should not operate by conscripting
me?"
Consider first the issue of specialization and whether it makes
sense, for instance, for lawyers in general practice, or corporate
practice, to be allowed to say: "I can't represent people in criminal
cases without possibly subjecting myself to discipline because I'm
not competent to handle these matters." I personally am always
torn on the issue, having spent nine years of my life representing
people in criminal cases. I want to believe that such representation
is arcane and intricate, and that only the truly initiated-not to
say geniuses- can really do it, but I am not sure that is the case
at all. There is a skill, but I find it hard to believe that the personal injury lawyer, for instance, or in fact any lawyer who has
had any training or devoted any attention to litigation, could not
acquire considerable criminal law ability very quickly. That is not
to say that such acquisition would be painless, because it would
take hard work, but the skill we are talking about, the special area
of competence, is litigation, not criminal law. Now, it might be
said that most criminal cases do not go to trial. So maybe what
we are talking about is not even litigation skill, but negotiationin which all practicing lawyers should be expert.
The likelihood of going to trial is undeniably greater in criminal
cases, and the ability to negotiate effectively turns peculiarly on
the wherewithal to go to trial. In the criminal cases, there is not
the maneuvering room allowed by extended discovery, or the financial considerations which can enter into negotiations in a civil case.
The main negotiating point of the defense lawyer in a criminal case
is her willingness and ability to go to trial. I would agree that
a lawyer who has never been in a courtroom may not be competent
to handle a serious criminal matter and should be allowed to excuse
herself on ethical grounds, at least from sole representation, under
the Code of Professional Responsibility.
This does not mean, however, that a lawyer could not associate
with someone who was competent in criminal matters, and learn
through the association; nor does it mean that a lawyer could not
assume the responsibility of becoming proficient in criminal law,
by starting with less serious cases, and/or by extra diligence. That
brings us directly to the issue of whether lawyers should feel an
obligation to involve themselves in representation of the indigent
accused. And this really does bring us full circle to the inherent
conflicts in the Code of Professional Responsibility: between the
canon which tells us to assist the legal profession in making representation available and the canon which admonishes us to be
competent.

PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY

At this point, we must draw back and do what the Code fails
to do: take some overview of the system of criminal justice and
the lawyer's role in it, and ask what ideally we would like to have.
The first premise is that we desire a system in which each person
in every case is truly represented according to the traditional model
of the dealings which lawyers and clients have with each other.
This, in fact, is the promise the Supreme Court has made, which
has never been fulfilled to all, or even most, indigent accused anywhere-partly because the profession does not want to do it, mostly
because society does not want to pay for it. The proposition that
competent counsel should represent poor people accused of a crime
in approximately the same fashion as she would represent the
person of means accused of a crime must be faced for what it is:
a moral question. The Constitution says that we shall do it and
we should; but if we fail to do it on any kind of a large scale,
as we always have, it does not mean that a lot of innocent people
will go to jail. We all know that most people accused of crime
did something along the lines of what they are accused of. Providing real counsel means that this knowledge of ours is not translated
into unfair shuttling of the person through the system.
The second premise upon which an ideal system of representation would be based is that there is something different and special
about criminal law which makes it useful for a large segment of
the profession to be involved with it. The idea about criminal law
has been that its administration reflects the tone and temper of
society, and indeed, as Winston Churchill suggested, the degree of
civilization. Because criminal law deals with the enforcement of
moral norms by the majority, there should be a broad-based participation in the system of enforcement to help assure that the law
reflects current values.
This idea that I have presented is not a generally accepted onein or out of the profession. Therefore, let me state plainly that
what I am arguing is that as a matter of professional ethics, a great
part of the bar should consider it a duty to become involved in
the practice of criminal law.
It often seems to me, since this is where I have labored most,
that the problems of professional ethics rise most sharply in the
heated facts of criminal cases. But the same conflicts emerge in
the more civilized arena of civil law. To illustrate that, in a course
on professional responsibility, students were presented with problems and the class sat as a bar disciplinary board, or as a law firm
or legal services office. After debate, a public vote was taken on
the solution of the problem. Each case was a close one. Virtually
all the votes were divided. This vote was taken among students
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who had no financial or other pressures which would keep them
from voting for the "right"thing.
One of the issues which hotly divided the class was the following
fact situation. A small successful computer company, which we
will call CDM, is bringing an antitrust action against a giant in
the field-RPM. CDM has subpoened a total of 27,000,000 RPM
documents at a cost of $3,000,000, from which its staff has culled
150,000 which bear on the relevant factual issues in the suit. CDM
constructs a computerized tape file to serve as a data base for the
otherwise incomprehensible collection of paper; the data base
reveals trends and comparisons not evident from an examination
of the documents themselves and also indexes the documents. The
data base provides strong factual ammunition for a good suit by
CDM against RPM. Meanwhile the Justice Department is also
bringing a large suit on behalf of the Government against RPM
because it considers the computer industry to be the most monopolized in the United States economy. RPM, having been burned by
releasing too much information to CDM, is dragging its feet in the
public action. The Justice Department is able to obtain fewer documents than CDM and does not have CDM's capacity for analyzing
them.
Focus on the role of the lawyer for RPM. Let us say that she
was formerly with the Justice Department and knows that the
Department does not have the capacity to attack the computer
industry; she also knows that using CDM's data base would enable
the Government to make its case. Therefore, she moves very
quickly to settle the case with CDM, in a way which will give them
a monopoly of a small part of the industry, a concession from RPM,
on the condition that they destroy the data base. Let us add the
fact that the lawyer, as a matter of personal philosphy, believes
that monopoly is a bad thing and that the computer industry, which
is her client, is heavily monopolized with bad results for everybody.
(Adding this fact simply strengthens the case; but it is not a necessary factor.) In negotiating for the destruction of the data base,
the lawyer has done the best thing for her client; simultaneously
she has done a very bad thing for society, and the American economy. Yet, what other role would you have the lawyer play except
that of representing her client to the utmost? Would you want
the lawyer to decide what she thought was best and advise the
client that in the public interest it should give up its monopoly?
Actually, that is not such a bad alternative, but it is not within
the realm of anything lawyers are presently advised to do by any
code of ethics. The lawyer who drives the hard bargain for her
client in this situation has all the professional and societal support;
she is good (that is, successful) and she has her eye on the goal
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of aiding her client-the only fixed star by which to be guided on
troubled ethical waters.
In the three examples set forth-the lawyers with information
needed and desired by the system, the lawyers needed to represent
an accused individual, who are not interested in doing so, and the
lawyer who makes a settlement which is probably not in the
interests of the society-the same conflicts with which we began
are involved: the clash between personal and professional ethics
and the total lack of systematization even within professional ethics
with the result that there are often two sets of competing demands
and mandates facing the individual lawyer.
The issues we have considered are examples of the hard questions-and the examples could be greatly multiplied. In dealing
with the hard problems, there is, of course, no easy answer. A
deep miscommunication between the profession and the public has,
moreover, created a lack of understanding of the lawyer's role in
the adversary process. Complicating the matter still further, there
is not a great deal of good will to fall back on in assessing an individual lawyer's performance. Presumably this lack of comunication can be remedied by educating both lawyers and the public.
Lawyers need to understand that they must confront issues on
which neither commitment to the Ten Commandments, nor humanitarian concerns for others, nor the public interest will give them
any help. The public must recognize that this is the task in which
lawyers are engaged. Toward this end, there should be more
emphasis in law school on the difficulties of the lawyer's role, the
ambiguities of professional ethics, the harshness of choices which
a morally sensitive lawyer will be called upon to make.
Even while accomplishing this educational task, we must also
remember that a great deal of the public's lack of understanding
and sympathy for the lawyers' role arises not from the lawyers'
handling of difficult and close questions but from their failure to
deal with easy ones. The bar has not only failed to establish a
code which will guide lawyers in difficult situations; it has failed
to discipline them for very basic errors which can only be called
crimes or incompetence. When the profession organizes to throw
out those who steal and lie, then we may be better able to draw
public understanding and support and even guidance on how to
handle more complex problems. A prestigious committee of the
American Bar Association, headed by former Justice of the Supreme
Court Tom Clark, recently concluded after three years of studying
lawyer discipline throughout the country that a scandalous (their
word) situation existed in which disbarred attorneys are able to
continue to practice in another locale; that lawyers convicted of
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federal income tax violations are not disciplined (if they are not the
former vice-president); that lawyers convicted of serious crimes are
not disciplined until after appeals, often a matter of three or four
years; that even after disbarment lawyers are reinstated as a
matter of course; that lawyers fail to report violations of the Code
and even criminal conduct by their brethren; that lawyers will not
appear or cooperate in proceedings against other lawyers; and
finally, that state disciplinary agencies are undermanned and underfinanced, many having no staff whatever for the investigation or
prosecution of complaints.
The committee outlines some very basic steps for remedying this
problem such as the financing of the disciplinary process, the
acceptance within the profession of the need for effective disciplinary procedures, and the exchange of information among disciplinary agencies. In the wake of Watergate, a great deal is being
accomplished in some places along these lines. In California, for
instance, there has been a sharp increase of disciplinary activity.
But there is still a long way to go before we have even minimal
enforcement of what everyone agrees are ideals of the profession
(again, I am not talking here about the hard problems, but about
minimal enforcement of basic standards). And yet, even that is
not always easy. Let me illustrate this with excerpts from an
actual case in which a lawyer was disbarred. Think about what
you would have done if you had had a vote on the disciplinary
committee.
Petitioner, an attorney at law, was charged in Alameda County
with four counts of soliciting others to commit perjury ....
In
September, 1957, he changed a plea of not guilty to guilty on counts
3 and 4 and the other two counts were dismissed. Sentence was
suspended and he was placed on probation for three years, conditioned in part on the payment of a $2,000 fine within one year....
A record of the conviction was filed with this court. We issued
an order to show cause why a final disciplinary order should not
be made and on November 26, 1957, suspended petitioner from the
practice of law pending final disposition of this proceeding. The
matter was then referred to The State Bar for report and recommendation as to the extent of discipline to be imposed ....
The
Board of Governors, by majority vote, followed the local committee's recommendation of disbarment. Three board members dissented on the ground that the discipline recommended was too
severe. Petitioner likewise urges that, in the circumstances, disbarment is too harsh a penalty. We conclude that the board's
majority recommendation should be accepted.
Petitioner does not dispute that the basic facts warrant disbarment but pleads that consideration be given to his background,
which he sets forth as follows: He is a Negro, born in Mississippi
in 1916, and presently forty-three years of age. In 1935 he
graduated from high school in Mississippi, attended two semesters
of college, and then quit in order to marry. He was inducted into
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the army in January, 1941, and commissioned a second lieutenant.
On the termination of hostilities in 1945 he reverted to inactive
military status and brought his wife and three children to Oakland,
California, where he has since resided. He engaged in various
business activities and employments and in 1949 enrolled at [an unaccredited law school] in Oakland under the G.I. Bill but continued
working outside class hours in order to support his family. He was
admitted to The State Bar in 1954, and thereafter, until his present
difficulties arose, practiced law independently in the Oakland area.
His clientele consisted "almost entirely of and was confined to the
Negro population of Alameda County."
Petitioner further declared to the local committee that his conduct had not been ethical or correct, that "I feel that I have done
wrong and I have brought discredit upon the Bar Association, and
all of you gentlemen here as lawyers ... and that I should be
punished ... I went to school at night and worked and I wasit was a dog eat dog affair and scuffling for everything." Petitioner
also said that his present difficulties had taught him a lesson and
"I believe that my ethics and my method of operation will be much
more conservative and much better . . . than it has ever been in
the past."
One of petitioner's character witnesses was a Methodist minister
who stated that petitioner "has been highly regarded as quite an
outstanding churchman, not only in his local church but in his
denomination. He is one of the leading laymen on the general
church level . . . [and] a very fine family man," that "it is the
feeling among" the church people that whatever petitioner "did on
this occasion was not in conformity with his usual conduct." The
other character witness was an Oakland roofing contractor who
stated that for two or three years he and petitioner had owned a
bar together, which petitioner managed; that "we were offered
money by bookmakers, peddlers of marijuana and that short of
thing . . .to operate in our bar, and Claude [petitioner] turned it
down cold"; that petitioner "had every opportunity" to "cheat me
out of some money and it wasn't done"; that 'We both got out of
the bar business because the only way we could have made any
money was slightly crooked. I have seen Claude time and time
again turn down the chance for a fast buck."
At the time (May, 1958) of the hearing before the local committee petitioner had paid $400 of his fine, had reported regularly
to the county probation department, had not obtained regular
employment but had had miscellaneous short jobs and was managing to meet a minimum of his obligations, and in the opinion of
the probation officer was 'making an excellent adjustment considering all the factors involved."'15
Would this be different if the lawyer were a white Nebraska
graduate? When we get down to it, in this case is it not a problem
of inferior education in the law school setting which may be what
has occasioned the recent interest in continuing education of the
15. In re Allen, 52 Cal. 2d 762, 763-67, 344 P.2d 609, 609-11 (1959).
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bar, and even a suggestion by the past president of the ABA that
lawyers be recertified every few years as to competence.
We are in the aftermath of this terrible congeries of scandal
designated Watergate which has involved not only lawyers and
which lawyers have had a primary part in cleaning up. Still,
because lawyers have held themselves out as the guardians and
purveyors of the laws, which have moral norms at their base, the
deep involvement of lawyers in Watergate has provided an impetus
for taking corrective measures which will educate lawyers and the
public about the demands of professional responsibility. Perhaps
we will reach that point described by the Supreme Court in which
the lawyers in our society stand "as a shield in defense of right
and to ward off wrong. From a profession charged with such
responsibilities there must be exacted those qualities of truthspeaking, of a high sense of honor, of granite discretion, of the strictest
observance of fiduciary responsibility, that have been compendiously described as moral character." Let me finally add that
nothing which has occurred in Watergate has shaken the validity
of the sentiments expressed by Justice Holmes, which I paraphrase-A person may live greatly in the law as elsewhere. His
thought may find its unity in an infinite perspective; there, as elsewhere, he may wreak himself upon life, may drink the bitter cup
of heroism, may wear his heart out after the unobtainable.

